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Zamyatin's We and the Idea of the Dystopie
Abstract
An examination of We clarifies conventions for the dystopic novel even as it reveals that We transcends
those conventions. Under the surface text, which presents a narrative of political and "romantic" struggle,
lie subtexts exploring the personal and ideological implications of the conflict between reason and
emotion. Analysis of these texts, seen in a New Comedy framework informed by elements of irony and
romance, demonstrates that on every level the novel fails to reach comic resolution. Moreover, it is this
very failure that marks the departure of We from the conventions of the dystopic novel. Like Brave New
World and 1984, We contains satire and an obvious dystopia. However, it does not contain the other
convention defining the genre—a recognizable and accessible moral norm. Rather, it depicts two
dysfunctional Utopian systems in conflict. In transcending the conventions of the dystopic novel and in
offering only partial resolution outside of its own flawed and mutually exclusive worlds, We explores the
contradictions of the "modern" experience.
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ZAMYATIN'S WE AND THE IDEA
OF THE DYSTOPIC
Margaret Lael Mikesell and Jon Christian Suggs
John Jay College, City University, New York

One of the more uncomfortable cultural perspectives of our time
forces us to realize that while the nineteenth century was one of
utopian and thus comic enthusiasms, the twentieth has been the
century of dystopic and ironic mechanisms. Revolutions as well as
lovers find themselves among the constantly betrayed. In Western
literature this condition is reflected in the fact that, although the
utopian novel makes an occasional appearance after 1919, the literary
expression of belief in a realizable utopian goal has been virtually
replaced in the twentieth century by the dystopic novel. Indeed, to
the modern reader all political novels seem dystopic. But such
categorizing, however born out of whatever despair, can be misleading and some attempt needs to be made to sketch out the limits
of the idea of the dystopic.
Such an exercise here focuses on Yevgeny Zamyatin's We,
generally considered the prototypical dystopic novel.' In fact, We is
not a dystopic novel at all, despite its attention to dystopian societies.
The terms dystopic and dystopia are properly literary rather than
political, a dystopic novel being a type of satirical novel which shows
life in a dysfunctional utopia and a dystopia the literary characterization of a dysfunctional utopia. Although dystopias are not limited
in their occurrence to the dystopic novel, they exist only in the
literary works which frame them and have no actual identity in the
phenomenal world of people and governments. In general, the portrayal of a dystopia is carried forward by the satirization of
elements of the imagined society which the author intends to be seen
as manifestations of its dysfunction rather than as sources of it.
Specifically in dystopic novels, the characterization is enhanced by
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the counterpositioning to the dysfunctional society of a more desirable
and manifestly more humane society which represents a morally
acceptable world to the reader.
In fact, these conditions do not appear in We. As close reading
and analysis will show, a multiplicity of comic texts permeated with
irony and informed by romance combine to make We more than a
simple indictment of a political or social philosophy. Attention to the
actual nature of the texts will give a fuller sense of the complexities of
Zamyatin's work and a clearer sense of the dimensions and limitations of the dystopic novel.
In brief, the book appears to be a journal kept by mathematicianengineer D-503, whose rocket ship, the Integral, is to carry the
gospel of the One State to the stars. D's journal is to be part of that
gospel and he promises his extraterrestrial readers to be faithfully
honest to his experience of life in a rational, collective society. As D
brings the Integral close to completion, however, the journal records
his personal disintegration. Some atavistic appetite for emotional
freedom is aroused in him by the woman 1-330, who is a secret agent
for a revolutionary group known as the Mephi. D falls "madly"
there is no other word for it-and possessively in love with her, and
she appears to manipulate this illegal passion for the revolutionary
aims of her group, which rest on her plan to capture the spaceship.
Following the failure of the plot, D is manipulated by the Benefactor,
head of the One State, into betraying 1-330 and her comrades. After
her execution, D lives on, lobotomized by the state in its attempt to
control the chaos generated by the aborted rebellion.
These events are set within the contrasting worlds of the One
State (the Glass World) and the Green World, which exists beyond
the wall enclosing the One State. The man-made Glass World
operates by the application of rationality to human social interaction, while the natural Green World celebrates sensation and emotion.
The One State is governed by an intricate system which determines
virtually all of the conduct of its citizens and is concerned only with
extending existing controls. In contrast, the social and political lives
of the denizens of the Green World are anarchistic and unstructured.
The developing conflict between these two worlds becomes the
matter of D's journal and its narrative comprises the surface text of
the novel. However, beneath the surface text are two subtexts which
scrutinize an equally crucial conflict, that between the personal and
ideological demands of reason and emotion. By placing these oppositions in the experience of one character, the multiple texts of the
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novel not only find their dramatic center but reveal the complexity of
the classic-romantic dialogue to which the twentieth century has fallen
heir and out of which the utopian-dystopian dichotomy has risen.
These conflicts and their consequence, the failure to achieve
personal, social or ideological integrity, dictate the formal nature of
the novel. The impulses toward resolution are set in a New Comedy
framework with a rather traditional pattern of comic conflict for
surface and subtext: two disparate elements need integration but are
blocked by some absurd condition or law and enlist the aid of a tricky
servant figure to finds ways through or around the absurd condition.
However, the comic resolution is stopped short on every level of We,
with the ironic distance from integration differing for each level. The
multiple texts are best described as conflict patterns expressed as
ironic comedy informed by themes of romance.
In the surface text, D-503' s desire for the integration of his illicit
love for 1-330 with his social identity as a citizen of the One State,
and his efforts to achieve that goal, make up the world of valued
action for the comedy; the attempted movement is, as usual, from an
absurd society to the desired world of love and harmony. In We,
however, as in all ironic comedy, this movement is initiated but the
grotesque world prevails and the desired world of the lovers is never
realized. The irony is intensified by the general tendency of such
comedy to throw its main emphasis onto blocking forces and the
futile struggle to identify them, rather than forward, as in romantic
comedy, onto scenes of reconciliation and union.
In We this tendency is expressed in variations of traditional New
Comedy roles and devices which involve the portrayal of 1-330 as
the nominal but demonic heroine, of the figure of the Benefactor as no
mere bumbling, rigid senex iratus but as the "projection of a human
will to tyranny,"2 and of the concierge of D's domicile as a tricky
servant whose manipulations lead to the arrest and destruction of the
"lovers." The cognitio, or scene of comic recognition, becomes the
agony of I-330's torture under the mindless gaze of the lobotomized
D-503; and the festive ritual, formalizing the accession of the lovers
to the center of the new order, becomes the ritual execution of 1-330
and her followers in the aftermath of their failed rebellion against the
old order. Thus the absurd world is maintained-and revealed as not
only absurd, but demonic.
This reading of the surface text as ironic comedy does not
account for the total complexity of the novel, nor for the failure of the
comic purpose toward which D-503 and 1-330 seem to have been
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driving. Other texts extend the meaning of this narrative, exploring
the psychological and ideological implications of its actions, again
within the structures of ironic comedy.
The first of these comic texts delineates D-503's struggle to
recognize and integrate the irrational and emotional part of his
psyche with his rational, collective self. In this internalized comic
process, the two sides of D's personality represent the separated
lovers, and the absurd condition preventing their union is the
endorsement of reason by the One State as the sole foundation for
personal and civic life. Initially, the definitive nexus for D is his
rational self and the state, but through the catalytic presence of 1-330
as some tricky servant of the psyche, a competing nexus, one between
D's reason and imagination, is adumbrated. This potential integration, which would betoken the successful comic resolution of this
subtext, the victory of the "I" over the "we," is frustrated as 1-330
imposes yet a third nexus-between D's emerging self and her

dominant personality.
As the novel opens, the unquestioned and complete dominion of
reason in D's mind makes him the perfect product, and subject, of the
state. In all phases of his life, D relies on the exactitudes of reasontime pieces, probabilities, "ethics based on subtraction, addition,
division, and multiplication."' His conscious mind having been
harnessed by the state, it is the unconscious and the non-reasoning
part of D which awakens, prodded by 1-330, and which becomes the
other half of the comic equation in this subtext. Using state jargon, D
identifies this "new" part of himself, which intrudes in the form of
dreams, fantasies and irrational impulses, as the "imagination" or
"soul," in the state's eyes an illness to be diagnosed and then
extirpated.
However, only through acknowledging this buried self can
D-503 achieve autonomy. This becomes clear during a brief sojourn
in the Green World, a locale which nurtures precisely those aspects
of the psyche suppressed by the state. Enthusiastically endorsing
"madness" at the Mephi's rock altar, he can see himself for the
moment differentiated from the vast regiment of numbers on whom he
usually relies for self-definition. But such insights have no cumulative
effect despite their recurrence and he cannot act upon them. Their
impact is registered only on the reader who, answering D's
unanswered questions and completing his ellipses, recognizes the
projected termini of his growth-integration and autonomy-without
D himself having such awareness.
https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol7/iss1/8
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The early promise of psychic integration for D, and its ultimate
failure, are both effected by 1-330, who in this subtext plays the role
of tricky servant as she entices D beyond the boundaries of state
dogma and value.4 The illegality of their love offers him a release
from the "unfreedom" of thought and action promulgated by the One
State and allows him to approach his individuality. Yet his love,
potentially such a creative force for him, ultimately produces one of
those "innumerable stupid tragedies" from which the "ancients"
were thought to have suffered.
In traditional comic processes, love is the organizing principle
on which the emergent society establishes itself. Exemplified in the
relationship between the hero and heroine, this love generally
includes reciprocity, respect for human dignity, and forgiveness;
it replaces the lust, power or psychopathology on which the absurd
society has been based. However, love itself is essentially powerless
to act in its own behalf while the absurd society holds sway. It is,
rather, manipulation of that society which obviates obstacles-a
manipulation which is usually directed by the subversive genius of
the tricky servant figure. In comedy, love does not conquer all;
chicanery does.
In the ironic subtext of D's psychic struggle, however, "love"
itself becomes a manipulative device in the hands of the tricky
servant. 1-330 encourages in D a love that is irrational, possessive
and personally demeaning. It does not follow the pattern of egalitarian
reciprocity celebrated in Shakespeare's romantic comedies. Rather,
echoing the tradition of Courtly Love, 1-330 requires of D-503 his
total submission, a demand which he embraces: "She used the
ancient, long-forgotten `thou'-the 'thou' of the master to the
slave. . . Yes I was a slave, and this, too, was necessary, was good"
(64). D's fledgling ego, even as it is nurtured by 1-330, undergoes a
marked attenuation: "I was dissolved, I was infinitely small, I was
a point . . ." (129). This process is accompanied by the equally
traditional symptoms of sensitivity and jealousy, products of the
uncertainty which 1-330 builds into the structure of their relationship.
Thus while love catalyzes the emergence of D's buried self, ultimately
it destroys rather than affirms personality because it demands not an
autonomous, fully integrated person but a submissive Courtly Lover.
This submission, masked as a love tied completely to the "soul"
or "imagination" of his atavistic self and keyed automatically to the
appearance of 1-330 in all of her roles or guises, cannot be a part of
any comic resolution involving the integration of D's emotions and
.
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rationality. Such a resolution must entail "an awakening to selfknowledge, which is typically a release from humor or a mechanical
form of repetitive behavior." The absurd humor is not obliterated, but
"transformed into an inner source of coherence."' The reverse
happens in this ironic comedy; manipulating the humor of excessive
rationality which promotes D-503's loyal citizenship in the One
State, 1-330 solicits from him an equally mechanical submission to
her will. His humor, so far from being transformed into an "inner
source of coherence," is the very stimulus to his eventual betrayal of
his own humanity. Torn between the mutually exclusive demands of
reason (the Benefactor) and imagination (1-330), D-503 eventually
seeks to obliterate all consciousness through the Operation, ending as
a "humanoid tractor" possessing neither reason nor imagination.
Although the events that signal the end of this comic subtext
coincide with those of the surface text, they must be read somewhat
differently. Here, the torture and death of 1-330 are not those that
obliterate the heroine from a comic equation as in the ironic close of
the surface text. They are, rather, the ultimate punishment of the
failed tricky servant. In most New Comedy, there is antagonism
between the senex iratus and the tricky servant who seeks to gull him
for the sake of the young lovers, but the senex is never allowed to
make good on his blustery threats of pain and annihilation. However,
in the ironic world of this subtext, 1-330 is a demonic variant of the
tricky servant who is betrayed to the equally demonic Benefactor by
the "lovers" she has pretended to serve. D-503's betrayal of 1-330
intensifies the irony, because it has been stimulated by the jealousy
accompanying the total submission to her personality which she has
fostered in him.
In the subtext we have just discussed, the illusion that 1-330
facilitates D's growth is systematically discredited by the destructive
effects of the love she demands. Her function slides from that of some
demonic tricky servant to that of a shadowy blocking humor; finally
she is not a facilitator but, like the Benefactor himself, a tyrant.
The implications of her role transformation become clear in a
discussion of a second comic subtext, one in which D-503 is the
figure whose manipulation of the absurd world is necessary to effect a
resolution of antagonistic forces and bring about a new society. That
he fails to do so as a consequence of his inability to integrate reason
and emotion is the linchpin of cause and effect that links those two
subtexts of ironic bondage.
In the second subtext of We, the comic equation changes. The
https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol7/iss1/8
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fundamental problem is the desire of the Green World to subsume the
Glass World. The two worlds are, in effect, the isolated "lovers,"
separated physically by the Green Wall and ideologically by their
mutually exclusive dependencies on reason and emotion. Although
D-503 is one of the separated "lovers" of the surface text, and he
contains both lovers in the psychomachia of the subtext we have just
discussed, it is his role as engineer of the Integral which fixes him
here as tricky servant. He is, as we have seen, truly enslaved to both
worlds, through passion on one hand and socialization on the other.
And he alone can manipulate the physical world in order to shatter the
exclusivity of the ideologies which divide it.
This subtext is propelled by the conventions of romance. The
myth of the victory of summer over winter, the delineation of the world
of innocence rather than experience and the rhythm of movement
from a "real" to a "green" world and back again are all present. But
they function so ironically that their near-demonic perspective makes
futile the struggle toward the wedding of two worlds.
In traditional myths of the defeat of winter, summer is represented
as a fecund female. But in We, summer's imago is the sharp-visaged,
sharp-toothed presence of 1-330 as vagina dentata, not earth
mother. Nor is hers a world of innocence, but one of decadence,
characterized by the Ancient House, rank growth at the foot of the
Green Wall, mad masses in the dark forest and secret passages in the
bowels of the city.
D-503 comes to this "romantic" world in a demonic parody of the
rhythms of romantic comedy in which no conversion takes place; this
is no faerie world of a midsummer night's dream. At the meeting of
the Mephi in the forest outside the wall, he embraces madness but
remains oblivious to its implications. He experiences a singular sense
of self, but on return to the "real" world of the One State forgets his
pledge to act for the Mephi. When 1-330 comes to him with a program for revolution, D is shattered at the betrayal of the One State
which his role entails. He can only think of escaping with 1-330, back
to the Green World beyond the Wall. He cannot see that she seeks no
haven there; it is the city, and its destruction, that she wants.
That he can be blind to this truth about her suggests the key to
his failure as tricky servant in this subtext. His commitment to action
is grounded in his passion for her and not in the idea of freedom against
tyranny. In fact, he cannot respond to concepts of "freedom" from
beyond the Wall in any fundamental manner as long as she circumscribes his emotional development with a demand for submission as
Published by New Prairie Press
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strong as that of the One State. And if D cannot attain true selfknowledge and thence true love, the Mephi must fail, for in a struggle
for D's submissive soul, 1-330 must lose to the One State. Convinced
by the Benefactor of I-330's exploitation of his love, D-503 confesses
to the Guardians, at once killing the self that loved 1-330, submitting
to that competing force, the One State, and assuring failure of the
revolution. Thus D's inability to achieve personal integration, evident
in the first subtext, prevents him from fulfilling the revolutionary aims
of the Mephi, which would have completed the comic action of this
subtext.
The foregoing discussion of surface and subtexts in We exposes
the many levels of defeat on which the novel ends. The suggestion in
the first subtext that the alternative which 1-330 offers D is not
freedom from enslavement but one tyranny in place of another raises
questions about the novel's thematic juxtapositions-questions which
are not allayed by the fact that in the second subtext the comic plot
again seems to promise less a victory over than an exchange of
tyrannies. Light can be cast on these apparent contradictions when we
examine some basic assumptions about the nature of the dystopic
novel.
The dystopic novel, we have already argued, is a form of satiric
novel, the object of whose attack is the dystopia or dysfunctioning
utopia. The specific targets of the dystopic novel's satire are elements
of the dystopia that manifest its dysfunction rather than explain its
origins, and the general nature of its dysfunctions is put into high
relief by the presence of alternative, and clearly preferable, modes of
action and/or systems of belief or organization.
Although We contains satiric elements and an obvious dystopia,
it is significantly different from true dystopic novels, those which, as
true satires, contain recognizable and accessible moral norms.6 Brave
New World and 1984 are generally cited as examples of this type. In
Brave New World the norm is objectified in the characterization of
the Savage, John, and in 1984 in the atavistic concerns of Winston
Smith. But there are no analogous values in the systemic subtext of
We, where the dystopic Glass World is opposed by the forces operating out of the Green World. If the moral norms of satire ought to be
relatively clear so that standards for measure are available to the
reader, what and where are those norms in this book? Are they found
in democracy or capitalism? These ideas reside outside the satireindeed, outside the novel. And what of the Green World? While in
this context it is Nature, the rebels it houses seem demonic and
https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol7/iss1/8
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their leader as much an alazon, as much an imposter, as the
Benefactor.'
We, instead of fitting the model of a dystopic novel by presenting
a dysfunctional utopia and using the revolutionary and romantic forces
of the Green World as counterpoints to totalitarianism, actually
presents two dysfunctional utopian systems in conflict. One of these,
the One State of the Glass World, is partially based on a Marxian
view of history and is the subject of the overt satire of the book. The
other, that rudimentary world for which the Mephi and the Green
World stand, is non-ideological and romantic, and although it could
be mistaken for the normative world of value, it is itself undermined
through the ironic and demonic nature of its depiction.
The importance of the portrayal of the Glass World lies not so
much in the specificity of its satire-petroleum-based food, rampant
Taylorism, machine music, governmental sophistry, terror, torture,
and the absence of personal freedom-as in its "recording" of the
experiential failure of a Marxian view of history. This view presupposes an early homogeneous organization of human experience,
a "pre-contract" society which has given way to a heterogeneous
"contract" society marked by a complex division of labor and by
human alienation. This will in turn give way to a technologically
advanced but spiritually reintegrated society, a telotic future that uses
the phenomenology of the "present" to aid in the restitution of the
spiritual homogeneity of the ancient, pre-contract society.' In the
Marxian version of the telotic world, the state, an agency called into
being by one class, usually a minority, to enable it to dominate the
majority, will eventually "wither away" as class distinctions vanish
into the classless society.
However, the future Zamyatin presents in We has not followed
Marxian rules. A collective, classless society has existed for one
thousand years, as D-503 lets us see by reproducing in his journal a
proclamation from the One State Gazette. Yet the very existence of
the Gazette presents us with the paradox: the state has not withered
away; it has increasingly dominated the lives of its citizens through
the application of scientific principles. The story D tells us is, in part,
that of the struggle between the entropic One State, which stands for
one failed utopian vision, and the Mephi of the Green World and their
natural processes, which represent yet another.
This latter vision describes an alternate world to that of the
collective state, one presumed valuable for its submission to natural
processes rather than to design. The romantically conceived Green
Published by New Prairie Press
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World is itself a utopian vision, but one that directs its attention
contra the vision of other literary utopias of the modern period.
Christopher Collins has suggested that the rebels against the One
State look back to the romantically-oriented utopias favored in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and that Zamyatin be considered
one of the first writers to direct twentieth-century Western utopian
thought to these models. However, there is a significant difference
between their characterization by Collins as "small, self-sufficient,
economically primitive communities, where the individual, free from
the inevitably corrupting influence of institutions and civilization,
might realize his natural goodness and kindness," and the world
desired by 1-330 and her Mephi.9
That world is not so much natural as it is mad, not as individualistic as it is primitively anarchic, and if the examples of 1-330 and her
followers, whose collective name is a contraction of Mephistopheles,
are to be taken as object lessons, it harbors not kindness or goodness
but violence and deceit. Nor does D-503 get arguments for economic
or personal autonomy from 1-330. The world of the rebels is not political or social, any more than Romanticism is politically or socially
specific.

On a more fundamental level, the Mephi represent a vision of
history that is in conflict with the concept of the irrevocable material
progress of history as expressed in Marxian thought and exemplified
in its dysfunctional form as the One State. The utopian vision which
guides 1-330 and her fellow conspirators looks to the past, to a Golden
Age that can be regained phenomenologically as well as spiritually
through revolution. Once the revolution has been recreated, 1-330
argues, the energy which represents its value immediately begins to
disappear into an increasingly entropic future and more revolution
becomes necessary. But her fetishistic use of the symbols of the past
and her arguments for the dismantling of the Glass World bespeak
the desire to recapture the essence of the past by returning to its
physical reality, to react against the present in search of a perfect past,
rather than to act with it in pursuit of a telotic future.
Thus We does not depict one dystopic society that by rights should
be replaced by a normative world of value on which we as readers
can agree. Rather the novel presents two unacceptable organizations
of experience. One, some failed collectivist vision that has led to a
tyranny of acquiescence, is opposed by a reactionary impulse toward
a natural anarchy that suggests a vision, attenuated by its own antihistorical bias, of a previous Golden Age of limited but free societies.
https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol7/iss1/8
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One offers order but no freedom; the other offers freedom as the
denial of order.
The use of the mechanisms of comedy to portray this conflict
precludes any reading of the texts as merely satiric or dystopic. By
following comic convention, particularly the rhythmic movements of
romantic comedy, the novel places a world of formless energy in
opposition to a structured society. The One State must be replaced, if
the Mephi are to have their way, with the universal forces of
change. These forces promote no real social structure, not only
because they are the elements of a romantic vision of universal
principles, but because in comedy rigidity and definition belong to the
usurpers and blocking humors who want predictable activity. In We,
those humors are the principles of the Glass World. Thus D's
"conversion" scene in the Green World assembly produces no
political vision in part because romantic comedy has no component
to match the structures of the "real" world. Casting a counter-utopia
in the structure of romantic comedy and giving that utopian vision no
social component makes a dialectical solution apparently unrealizable,
since comedy seems to abhor the presence of mutually exclusive
stances.10 The ability of the tricky servant to function as manipulator
and mediator depends upon the potentiality of the absurd law to be
altered, of the blocking humor to bend, even to disappear.
The novel does offer two very partial resolutions which, though
suggestive, leave untouched its central dialectical problems wherein
two dystopian visions appear, one emerging in response to the
existential fact of the other. There is a comic resolution of sorts which
comes not through the alteration of the absurd world but through its
transcendence, in the portrayal of 0-90, D's other lover. Her
criticism of One State excesses suggests her independence from its
dogmas, and her leitmotifs, the love of flowers, the expanding womb,
connect her with the Green World-not with its revolutionary energies but with its natural processes. Her portrayal evokes the fecund
female imago which has been missing in the depiction of the Green
World. This theme culminates in her abandonment of the Glass
World to bear and raise her child in the Green World-the one
successful act of defiance in the novel. 0-09's instinctive determination to live by the values of familial and generational love offers the
novel's only response to both its absurd worlds. But the structural
antitheses which lie at its center remain untouched by her portrayal.
A more significant resolution occurs in the fact of the journal
itself. Through his daily entries, D-503, in the Romantic role of the
Published by New Prairie Press
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artist/maker as mediator, attempts to create order out of increasing
disarray and suffuses the two worlds he describes with his own
sensibility. As if he were also the most modern of novelists, he makes
the story of his growth and development as an "artist" the story of his
paradoxical worlds as well. In this narrative, these worlds are held in
the most delicate balance by the mediating power of his language.
D-503's use of language offers the reader a synthesis denied in
character and plot. From the opening entry, in which he constructs a
metaphor for his diarist's task out of the fundamental experience of
pregnancy, his reliance on figurative language becomes a compelling
mediator between the seemingly implacable oppositions of reason
and emotion, Glass World and Green World. His evocations of the
World of Reason gain their vividness-indeed their power for the
reader-through this figurative language, where frequently organic
and geometric metaphors slice across each other, conveying on the
rhetorical level a synthesis denied elsewhere. D's syntax, punctuated
as it is by ellipses and interrogatives, insistently directs the reader to
the very synthesis which eludes him. Finally, permeating such
rhetorical devices is the tone of the journal. By relying on a
vocabulary laden with affective connotations, D's journal becomes,
in toto, his emotional response to the complicated pressures of his life
and his world. Such a preoccupation ignores ideology and transcends
obdurate dichotomies.
The distinctiveness of D's style proclaims a powerful individuality which forces the reader to care about what happens to its creator.
Even as he chronicles his happy submission to the Glass World and
his tortured submission to I-330-in fact in the very act of recording
these willful diminutions for his readers-he asserts the primacy of
the self through a style which insists on the very individuation he
elsewhere denies.
It is significant, then, that D's language changes abruptly after
he undergoes the Operation. The last entry, as he himself observes,
contains "No delirium, no absurd metaphors, no feeling: nothing but
facts" (p. 231). The linguistic flatness, even linearity of this entry
reflects the defeat attending his narrative and underscores his own
descent into stasis. Nevertheless, neither the narrative's end nor its
tone brings similar defeat to the reader. For in addition to the ironies
previously discussed, we as audience are left with the last irony, that
the very distinctions available to us but inaccessible to the protagonists
allow us our own syntheses. This affective resolution suggests at once
the limitations of the dystopic novel and some of the strengths of We.
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We know what is wrong in both the worlds of We, or we can know
if we look closely at the conflicts as the novel presents them. But if we
accept too readily the simplicities of categorization, we risk losing
sight of the novel's complexity. With its multiple layers of irony and
its seemingly romantic opposition to the entropic tendencies of
systematic thought, We offers us, as no dystopic novel can, the
central contradiction of the modern experience, the failure of order to
sustain life and the failure of energy to sustain purpose. For as a form
of satire, the dystopic novel is limited in what it may say to us; it may
show us what could happen to our civic lives and suggest what ought
to be. But works like We, that seek out the deeper contradictions of
our fundamental drives for order or for chaos, for passion or for love,
are not simply satiric and only appear to be dystopic. These works
draw on the full range of mythic and ethical structures imbedded
within our common experience to produce intimations of what is,
rather than premonitions of what ought to be.
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